Reconsideration and Record Substitution: Connecticut’s 1814 Reversal on the Titles of Nobility Amendment

By Stanley I. Evans

Abstract
This Article examines Connecticut’s apparent reversal on the Titles of Nobility Amendment (TONA) between 1813 and 1814 and argues that the committee report now preserved as the official record was most plausibly rewritten during the political upheaval following the British blockade of 1814. Drawing upon archival evidence—including the 1958 Public Records of the State of Connecticut, the State Archives’ confirmation that the legislative journals of 1810 through 1815 remained unbound until after November 1815, and forensic analysis of the extant manuscript—the Article situates the rewritten report within the climate of Federalist hostility toward President Madison and demonstrates that administrative substitution was both possible and politically expedient.

Introduction

The Titles of Nobility Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1810, sought to bar any citizen accepting a title or emolument from a foreign power from holding office or citizenship. By 1813, thirteen states had ratified the measure, including Connecticut—then a Federalist stronghold whose legislature had nonetheless voted in favor of ratification. Yet the document that survives in Connecticut’s official record today presents the opposite conclusion: a committee “of opinion that it is not expedient to ratify.” The discrepancy between the favorable report recorded in 1813 and the negative text now extant raises questions about how Connecticut’s official stance changed and how its records came to reflect that reversal.

Evans argues that the evidence supports a single, coherent explanation: the committee report on file today was recopied and rewritten in 1814 to reflect a post-blockade reversal, with an imitated signature of Committee Chair Theodore Dwight affixed to preserve continuity of form. The act was administrative, not conspiratorial—an expedient adjustment carried out during a moment of political crisis and bureaucratic fluidity.

Connecticut’s Legislative Recordkeeping, 1810–1815

The Connecticut State Archives confirms that the General Assembly’s journals and loose papers for 1810 through 1815 “were not bound into volumes until sometime after November 1815.” (Connecticut State Archives communication, Hartford.) This meant that for over five years, all committee reports, resolves, and engrossed copies remained in loose-leaf folio, held in the Secretary of State’s custody. In such a system, substitution or recopying of individual folios could occur easily and without formal record of revision.

Administrative practice allowed clerks to prepare “fair copies” of resolutions once their text was finalized. If a measure was reconsidered before binding or publication, the clerk might simply copy the corrected version and discard the superseded sheet. Within that window—between 1813 and 1815—Connecticut’s Assembly could have replaced an earlier report with a new one that better reflected its political disposition.

The Political Climate in Connecticut, 1813–1815

Connecticut’s Federalist leadership had long opposed the Jeffersonian-Madisonian program. By 1813, however, local politics were still divided: Federalist legislators often voted along pragmatic rather than partisan lines. The war’s early years saw relative moderation, and the proposal to ratify TONA fit comfortably within Federalist suspicion of aristocratic privilege.

The equilibrium collapsed in April 1814, when the British blockade extended along New England’s coast. Maritime trade—Connecticut’s economic lifeline—ground to a halt. Federalist merchants and legislators blamed Madison’s administration for mismanaging the war and exposing New England commerce to ruin. Newspapers in Hartford and New London thundered against the “mad project of the Virginia dynasty” and called for states to resist federal encroachment. (Hartford Courant, Apr. 22, 1814.)

Anti-Madison sentiment turned into open defiance. Governor John Cotton Smith refused federal militia calls, and by late 1814 Connecticut delegates were preparing for the Hartford Convention. Within that climate, maintaining on record a committee report favoring a Madison-era constitutional amendment became politically untenable. A negative report would signal Connecticut’s estrangement from the administration without requiring a formal rescission vote.

The 1813 Committee Report and the 1958 Public Record Entry

The 1958 edition of the Public Records of the State of Connecticut preserves an unambiguous summary of the original proceeding:

“Report of committee favorable to ratifying aforesaid amendment. Accepted & approved. Resolve in accordance with above report.” (Public Records of the State of Connecticut (1958) at 312.)

This entry reflects the record as it stood in 1813. The committee chaired by Theodore Dwight—Assistant to the General Assembly from 1811 to 1815—reported “favorable” to ratification, and the Assembly adopted the recommendation. No journal entry indicates a subsequent vote reversing that decision. The absence of any rescission strengthens the inference that the surviving “not expedient to ratify” text emerged later through administrative substitution rather than legislative reconsideration.

Evidence of Rewriting and the Forged Signature

The manuscript report attributed to 1813 survives as a single folded sheet of rag paper written entirely in uniform brown ink. The text contains extensive cross-outs of the favorable clauses and a concluding paragraph asserting that “it is not expedient…to ratify.” At the bottom appears the name “Theodore Dwight” written in the same ink and hand as the final paragraph.

A handwriting expert retained by Evans examined the document and concluded that the signature “does not correspond in stroke rhythm, slant, or formation to authenticated signatures of Theodore Dwight from the May–June 1813 session” and that “the uniformity of ink and hand throughout indicates a single-session recopying of the text.” (Expert Report on Handwriting Analysis, on file with author.) The expert’s findings corroborate visual comparison: the genuine Dwight hand shows a fluid right-slanting script with a long terminal flourish, whereas the committee-report signature is cramped and upright, matching the body text rather than Dwight’s distinctive style.

Because Dwight was chairperson of the committee, his authentic signature was indispensable for any legitimate report. If he were unavailable or unwilling to sign a rewritten version, a clerk imitating his hand would have been the simplest means of producing an apparently valid copy. Such imitation was not unusual in early-nineteenth-century clerical practice, particularly when continuity of form mattered more than autograph authenticity.

Administrative Opportunity for Substitution

The period between April 1814 and November 1815 provided both motive and opportunity for administrative substitution. The Assembly’s papers were unbound; clerks were routinely preparing engrossed “fair copies” for transmission to the Secretary of State. A directive from the Council or the Governor’s office could easily have instructed the clerk to prepare a new version “correcting” the committee’s stance. The new copy—clean, uniform, and bearing an imitation of the chair’s signature—would replace the original in the Secretary’s bundle. When the journals were finally bound after November 1815, only the rewritten version remained.

The mechanism required no conspiracy, only ordinary bureaucratic discretion. In the small world of Hartford’s legislative offices, such alterations were feasible and often undocumented. Once the new copy occupied the file, the earlier favorable report could be destroyed or reused as scrap. Given rag paper’s low cost and the absence of a duplicating system, there would have been little incentive to preserve an obsolete version.

Political Plausibility and the Logic of Revision

By mid-1814 Connecticut’s legislature was deeply antagonistic to the Madison administration. Ratifying an amendment proposed under Madison’s auspices—one perceived to strengthen federal control over titles and foreign relations—conflicted with Federalist claims of state sovereignty. Reversing the record symbolically aligned Connecticut with the wider New England resistance culminating in the Hartford Convention.

Rewriting the committee report served multiple purposes. It allowed the Assembly to appear consistent—no public record of rescission—while ensuring that any future inspection of the state’s files would reveal opposition rather than assent. It also insulated Connecticut from accusations of disloyalty when Federalists later denounced the Madison administration’s policies; the paper trail now matched the politics.

Administrative recopying thus functioned as a quiet legal fiction: the state’s records were harmonized with its new political reality without violating formal procedure. Because no law required publication of committee reports before binding, the act remained invisible to later historians until the physical manuscript was examined.

Legal-Historical Implications

If the committee report on file is indeed a 1814 recopy, Connecticut’s apparent “non-ratification” must be reevaluated. The Public Records of the State of Connecticut (1958) preserves the state’s own acknowledgment that the committee was “favorable to ratifying.” No contrary legislative action is documented. Under established constitutional practice, a state’s ratification stands unless rescinded by the same authority that approved it; administrative alteration of records cannot nullify a legislative act.

The plausibility of record substitution also bears on broader questions of federal constitutional documentation. The Department of State’s later confusion—its possession of conflicting Connecticut certifications, one affirmative and one negative—mirrors the archival instability within the state. Such uncertainty could have enabled Secretary of State James Monroe, later President, to prefer the negative certification when compiling official tallies in 1816–1817, thereby shaping subsequent federal understanding of TONA’s status.

Conclusion

Archival, political, and handwriting evidence converge on a consistent narrative. In 1813, Connecticut’s legislative committee chaired by Theodore Dwight reported favorably on the Titles of Nobility Amendment, and the Assembly approved that recommendation. The 1958 Public Records of the State of Connecticut preserves that fact. Sometime between April 1814 and November 1815, amid the economic devastation of the British blockade and the rise of anti-Madison Federalism, the committee report was recopied to express opposition to ratification. The substituted version, written in uniform ink and bearing an imitated Dwight signature, entered the official files and later became the version of record.

Given the unbound status of legislative papers during that period, such substitution was administratively simple and politically expedient. Connecticut’s reversal reflects not merely a clerical act but a microcosm of the state’s transformation from cautious cooperation to active resistance during the War of 1812. For historians and legal scholars, the episode illustrates how documentary processes—binding delays, clerical discretion, and the politics of recordkeeping—can reshape constitutional history without formal legislative action.

(All archival materials and expert analyses cited are on file with the author.)

Connecticut’s August 1814 Certification and the Madison Administration’s Refusal to Accept It

Abstract
In August 1814 the State of Connecticut transmitted a second certification to Washington purporting to “not ratify” the Titles of Nobility Amendment (TONA). The Madison administration, already treating the amendment as adopted, declined to recognize the late submission as valid. This Article reconstructs that episode from contemporary manuscripts—Governor John Cotton Smith’s transmittal letter of August 16, 1814, Secretary of State Thomas Day’s engrossed resolve, and James Monroe’s correspondence as Secretary of State—and situates it within the political crisis that swept Connecticut during the British blockade of 1814. The evidence demonstrates that the federal government continued to regard TONA as ratified notwithstanding Connecticut’s attempted reversal, viewing the new certificate as procedurally defective and politically motivated.

I. Background: The Titles of Nobility Amendment and Connecticut’s Initial Ratification

Congress proposed the Titles of Nobility Amendment on May 1, 1810, prohibiting any citizen who “accepts, claims, receives, or retains any title of nobility or honor” or emolument from a foreign power from holding U.S. citizenship or office. Thirteen states were required for adoption. By the spring of 1813, thirteen legislatures—including Connecticut—had approved it. The Public Records of the State of Connecticut later summarized:

“Report of committee favorable to ratifying aforesaid amendment. Accepted & approved. Resolve in accordance with above report.” (Public Records of the State of Connecticut (1958) at 312.)

The Assembly’s favorable vote was reported to Washington and included in James Monroe’s official tallies as Secretary of State. In January 1814 Monroe issued a circular to American ministers abroad noting that “this amendment having been adopted by a large majority of the states, the President is of opinion that it would be improper to grant exequaturs to citizens of the United States” acting under foreign commissions (Department of State, Jan. 12, 1814, Circular to the Foreign Ministers). At that point the executive branch regarded the amendment as lawfully ratified and in force for administrative purposes.

II. Connecticut’s Political Reversal, April–August 1814

In April 1814 the British blockade choked New England commerce, devastating Connecticut’s maritime economy. The Federalist leadership, already hostile to Madison’s war policy, moved from reluctant cooperation to open defiance. Governor John Cotton Smith and the Council of Assistants denounced federal conscription efforts and refused to place state troops under federal command. Federalist newspapers condemned the “Virginia cabal” in Washington and warned that “submission is ruin.” (Hartford Courant, Apr. 22, 1814.)

Within this atmosphere of acute partisanship, continued appearance of ratification for a Madison-era constitutional measure became politically untenable. The legislature reconvened in May 1814, and a new committee—operating under the same chairmanship but different political pressure—drafted a substitute resolution declaring that Connecticut “do not ratify” the proposed amendment. The surviving manuscript, engrossed by Secretary of State Thomas Day, bears the great seal and is dated to that session. Yet the accompanying correspondence shows that the formal transmission to Washington occurred later, in August 1814.

III. The August 1814 Certification

Three documents mark this episode:

The Engrossed Resolve — a two-page folio signed by Thomas Day and sealed with the state arms, stating:

“Resolved by this Assembly, That this Assembly do not ratify the foregoing amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the same on the part of this State is not ratified.” (Connecticut Resolve, May 1814, certified Aug. 1814.)
Governor John Cotton Smith’s Transmittal Letter, dated Sharon, 16 August 1814:

“I have the honour to enclose the duplicate copy promised in my last and I am with great respect Sir your obedient and most humble servant, John Cotton Smith.” (Addressed to James Monroe, Secretary of State.)
Department of State Acknowledgment — docketed in the Department’s “Domestic Letters” but never entered among valid ratifications.

The timing is critical. Monroe had already issued his January circular describing the amendment as adopted; by August the Department considered the constitutional process closed. The State Department therefore treated Connecticut’s new resolve as out of order—an attempted withdrawal after ratification rather than a timely response.

IV. Federal Rejection of the August 1814 Submission

No reply from Monroe to Governor Smith survives, but later State Department correspondence reveals the Department’s consistent stance. In an official letter of October 30, 1816, Monroe wrote to Ralph B. Forbes of Boston explaining the government’s position:

“Upon an examination of this subject, it is ascertained that the requisite number of the States have accepted the proposition made by Congress and that it has thus become a part of the Constitution.” (Department of State Letter, Oct. 30, 1816.)

This 1816 statement—two years after Connecticut’s attempted rescission—confirms that the Madison administration continued to regard the Titles of Nobility Amendment as adopted. The August 1814 certificate therefore had no operative effect.

The Department’s reasoning mirrored constitutional custom: a state’s ratification, once transmitted, could not be withdrawn absent congressional consent. The same rule was later affirmed during debates on the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Connecticut’s first certificate (1813) was already in federal custody, the second (1814) was treated as a nullity.

V. Administrative Handling and the “Invalid” Designation

The State Department’s record system in 1814–1817—hand-entered registers of “Letters Received from State Governments” (Record Group 59, National Archives)—shows one entry for a Connecticut transmission received in 1813 and no second acknowledgment in 1814. The absence of docketing suggests that clerks were instructed not to record the later paper as a valid constitutional act. In ordinary practice, correspondence considered procedurally defective was filed separately among “miscellaneous state papers.” When Monroe prepared his 1816 tallies for the President’s report to Congress, only the affirmative certifications were counted.

By declining to docket Connecticut’s August 1814 resolve as an official state action, the Department effectively rejected the document while leaving no public trace of the decision—a typical administrative expedient for disputed submissions.

VI. Legal and Political Implications

Connecticut’s August 1814 certification illustrates the friction between state politics and federal constitutional administration during wartime. The Federalist legislature sought to repudiate what had become, symbolically, a Madisonian amendment. The Madison administration, equally determined to assert national authority, dismissed the reversal as illegitimate. Both actions were legally colorable within early-Republican constitutional practice, but the federal government’s interpretation prevailed because it controlled custody of the ratification records.

The timing also underscores Monroe’s dual position. As Secretary of State (1811–1817) he maintained the ratification files; as President (1817–1825) he later supervised publication of the Laws of the United States that included the amendment text. His consistent references to the amendment as “adopted” suggest that Connecticut’s August 1814 reversal never altered the official count.

VII. Conclusion

The August 1814 documents—Thomas Day’s engrossed resolve and Governor John Cotton Smith’s polite covering letter—represent Connecticut’s attempt to repudiate its earlier ratification of the Titles of Nobility Amendment. The Madison administration’s silence toward that communication, followed by Monroe’s 1816 assertion that the amendment “has thus become a part of the Constitution,” demonstrates that the federal government held the second certification invalid. Administratively, the Department of State continued to treat the amendment as adopted and operative, consistent with Monroe’s January 1814 circular withdrawing exequaturs from citizens serving foreign powers.

For constitutional historians, this episode reveals how wartime politics and unbound bureaucratic procedures allowed state and federal actors to construct competing documentary realities. Connecticut’s August 1814 certificate stands not as an effective rescission but as evidence of a broader regional revolt against Madison’s administration—one that the federal government quietly but decisively overruled by treating the earlier ratification as final.

(All manuscripts and archival citations on file with the author.)